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2Almost ten years  of post-Communist transition have elapsed. Much of the initial
euphoria and illusions  have gone. People, including academic professionals, realize that this
historical endeavor is a very complex and complicated affair. The state of transition compels
one to scrutinize the process of change more carefully,  to go beyond stereotypes, myths, and
oversimplifications. As a World Bank official working on post-Communist countries stated a
few years ago, one should judge a policy on its own merits by skewing intellectual
prejudices.1 This prodding was strongly reinforced by J. Stiglitz recently.  He remarked that
the failures of reforms “are not just due to sound policies being poorly
implemented…[F]ailures go deeper, to a misunderstanding of the foundations of a market
economy as well as a misunderstanding of the basics of an institutional reform process.”2
One need not fully agree with Stiglitz to see that he makes a valid point.
This paper discusses the macroeconomic dynamic in Romania in the last decade and
links it to two major issues: the legacy of resource misallocation and institutional fragility.
The legacy of resource misallocation leads to very intense strain in the system when there is a
brutal and dramatic change of relative prices to market-clearing levels.  At the new prices,
resources should flow from low to high productivity areas, a process which can generate
much pain in a real economy.  The strain or tension involved explains why there is much
opposition to change, and why coalitions of interests emerge to hinder deep restructuring.
Strain also explains why large quasi-fiscal deficits  are a feature of post-command
economies, which creates an endemic proclivity for high inflation.
Institutional fragility is another dimension of the transformation process which
underlines the complicated nature of change, including restructuring.  The lack of institutions,
of organized markets, hinders a smooth reallocation of resources and has a negative effect on
performance at both the micro and macroeconomic levels.  It also helps to explain the intense
friction in the system, especially rising transaction costs, that arises during the passage
between two regimes.  This line of reasoning finds substantial analytical support in recent
work done by Olivier Blanchard.3
Some analysts relate disequilibria, including inflation, primarily  to the breakdown of
the political process and rent-seeking activities by old elites.4  While this is plausible, the
approach adopted in this paper emphasizes the magnitude of the required resource
reallocation and friction, which are sometimes so large that they undermine attempts to
achieve durable stabilization.  It is arguable that the success of the leading transition
economies is  primarily due to the ability of policy  to deal with the magnitude of required
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3resource reallocation and friction, while not being “captured” by vested interests.
Together with strain, institutional fragility helps to explain stop-go policies (boom
and bust cycles), as well as many of the setbacks and inconsistencies in the transition process.
Fuzziness and lack of transparency characterize the realm of public finance.  For example,
banks are frequently the vehicle for granting subsidies.  Primitive banking systems, which are
“captives”’ of entrenched structures, are likely to perpetuate much of the old pattern of
resource allocation or misallocation,  and to engage in significant quasi-fiscal operations,
with the latter showing up in high rates of inflation or of bank failures. Romania’s experience
is a highly relevant example of how strain and institutional fragility condition macroeconomic
stabilization.
Romania started transition at a disadvantage, with significantly worse initial conditions
than those prevailing in the leading reform countries,5 which suggests that her policy-makers
have also had less room to maneuver.6 The end result is that they have not yet been able to find a
clear way forward to a well-functioning market economy.  Under the current unfavorable
conditions in the world economy, it will be increasingly difficult for the Romanian economy to
escape from this ‘“path dependency.”’
In the following analysis of economic developments during 1990-1999, stop-go policies,
resurgent inflation, macro-disequilibria, and bank failures emerge as the inevitable outcomes of
insufficient restructuring and fragile institutions.  It is submitted that without large inflows of
foreign direct investment (FDI) and creation of appropriate institutions, the economy is unlikely
to be able to escape from the grip of entrenched structures.  It is also submitted that more
privatization would help to increase the inflow of foreign capital.  The slow pace of restructuring
has maintained intense strain in the system and has led to a bad path dependency.
Part One deals with two major underplayed issues: institutional fragility, and the
magnitude of the required resource reallocation that engenders strain.  Part Two focuses on
economic developments in Romania between 1990—1999 and takes a brief look ahead. Part
Three is a summing up of the main tenets of the paper.
1. Two major underplayed issues
There are two important issues linked with the reality of post-Communist
transformation which, in  this author’s view,  have been largely underestimated. One issue
regards the institutional fragility of post-command systems and the implications of systemic
regime  change;7 the other issue refers to the magnitude of required resource reallocation in
relation to the new relative prices dictated by liberalization and opening of the economy.
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 A basic message of conferences debating the experience of ten years of post-Communist transition is that
institutions are essential in explaining economic performance. But it is clear, that, only a few years ago, there
were many who still held a pretty simplified view of what it takes to create a market economy, who thought
about institutional change through the glasses of “voodoo economics.”
41.1 Institutional fragility
The post-Communist societies of Europe are  entities that show common structural
traits, but also major discrepancies.  The latter can be linked with the different pre-
Communist legacies (the former Czechoslovakia, as a leading industrial country during the
inter-war period, is the most conspicuous example) and the different brands of national
central planning, in terms of relaxation of direct controls and economic policy choices. The
different histories explain widely different incomes per capita, why market institutions vary
qualitatively among the national environments, and why macro- and micro-disequilibria
differed among them on the eve of 1989. Undoubtedly, Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and Slovenia had a substantial competitive edge after 1989, at the start of transition.
Unsurprisingly, all these countries have fared better than the rest in their stabilization and
reform programs, although, as some would argue,  their recipes were not similar.  The
common thread that explains their performance has been the functioning of their institutions,
including better public governance.
In a superb article a few years ago, Mancur Olson emphasized the role of institutions
in explaining economic performance.8 In economies in transition, the functioning of
institutions can be linked with (a) the overall legacy of the command system, the lack of
knowledge of individuals and organizations, or what one can call organizational and
institutional capital; and (b) with “co-ordination failures”’ entailed by systemic change, in
the vein of Blanchard’s analysis.9 Regarding these “co-ordination failures,” there is need to
consider that “[i]mperfect and costly information, imperfect capital markets, imperfect
competition: these are the realities of market economies – aspects that must be taken into
account by those countries embarking on the choice of an economic system.”’10  The
implication is that one needs to consider how market economies actually function.
On the one hand, institutional backwardness points at the lack of specific knowledge
of individuals and of society as a whole and at the constraints for genuine institutional
change.  On the other hand, it suggests that there is much scope for a system to get outside
what can be conceived as an ideal tunnel of evolution. In Romania, there is much talk about
the weakness of institutions, which affects the formulation and implementation of public
policy; by this is meant  a very weak state.
The stress put on the burden of the past is meant to warn against its dragging effects
and an unfavorable path dependency, from which it may not be easy to break away. The
burden of the past makes it harder to overcome the fragility of the emerging market
institutions, and enhances the potential for the dynamics of change to get out of control.
Institutional fragility was much underestimated by policymakers and their advisers.11
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5Similarly inadequate is the neglect of the extreme complexity of the process under
way. Gross oversimplifications and “black versus white” reductionism, as well as the lack of
understanding of how interests are socially articulated – particularly in a transition period –
cannot but obscure real processes and lead to hasty and inadequate decisions. “The elite
failed to understand that society was a far more complex organism than what they had
thought, that simple, well-meaning declarations were not effective in politics, that ideas and
programs would have to be sold to the public, and that institutions were necessary for the
routinized exercise of power.” 12
Apart from the insufficient analytical attention paid to the institutional build-up in the
transforming societies in Europe, one has to consider the seeds of instability produced by this
fragility. The poor performance capacity of immature institutions needs to be mentioned in
this context. For example, the debate on universal vs. narrow banks -- on whether and how
banks should be involved in resource allocation -- is quite relevant for the concern created by
immature market institutions in terms of enhancing instability and uncertainty in the
system.13  From a broader perspective, one can pose the issue of the governance capabilities
of the political and economic elites – to what extent these elites can induce and manage
change  when so much fuzziness, volatility, and uncertainty prevails.   One can also assume
that institutional fragility will bear significantly on the nature of local capitalism.
1.2 The magnitude of resource reallocation: the emergence of strain
Another issue which has not been sufficiently highlighted in the professional14 and
public debate is the dimension of the inherited misallocation of resources – that is,  the sheer
scale of disequilibria, at the new relative prices, that indicates the magnitude of required
restructuring as compared to the ability of the system to undergo wide-ranging and quick
change. Once the combination of internal shocks – engineered by reforms or triggered by the
uncontrolled processes of system dissolution – and external shocks occurred, the structure of
the economy and the legacy of resource misallocation put the system under exceptional
strain.   Appendix 1 provides an analytical explanation of strain, which is buttressed by an
empirical analysis done by OECD experts; this analysis confirms that Romania started
transition at a comparative disadvantage.
At the dramatically changed relative prices, and should financial discipline be strictly
imposed, many inefficient enterprises would be out of the economic circuit.  They may try to
survive by reducing X-inefficiency,15 but in the end, should potential efficiency gains be evenly
distributed, they would have to bow out. In short, the array of structurally inefficient enterprises
forms a silent ‘“conspiracy” against change; it represents entrenched personal stakes, which
oppose restructuring for obvious reasons. Together with other factors, including insufficient
policy credibility, the lack of capacity to pay triggers a chain reaction of inter-enterprise debt, of
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6arrears in general, when the latter include non-payments to the state budget. Arrears reduce the
relevance of low official budget deficits when quasi-fiscal deficits are large. It should be said
that quasi-fiscal deficits have been looming ominously over economic policy in Romania in the
years of transformation.
 Arrears can be seen as temporary quasi-inside money,16 which conditions the
effectiveness of monetary policy (Appendix 2 uses a simple model in order to illustrate how
arrears affect stabilization policy).17 In an interesting study, C. Carare and E. Perotti conclude
that, in Romania, arrears are a result of inconsistent reform policies and the
underdevelopment of financial markets.18  Consequently, they argue in favor of hardening
budget constraints, which is an unquestionable objective. But, like other analysts, they do not
explain why reform policy has been inconsistent and the structure of incentives for banks so
hard to change. Thence, the relevance of strain.19
What are the major implications of strain? One is that these economies can easily
become exceedingly unstable and that their capacity to absorb shocks is quite low; these
economies have a high degree of vulnerability.20 Another implication is that policymakers
face extremely painful trade-offs and that, in most cases, unless policy is clever and sufficient
external support is available, the room to maneuver is quite limited. Finally, macroeconomic
stabilization in certain countries hides deeply seated tensions, which, sooner or later, come
into the open unless deep restructuring takes place.
Strain needs to be seen in relation to unemployment. Current unemployment rates in
the transforming economies are not exceedingly high in comparison with the European levels
of the mid-nineties, and this could assuage the perception of strain. However, the yardstick
used is itself questionable, taking into account the unemployment problem in Western
Europe. Secondly, the weakness of safety nets acquires particular significance in the poorer
post-Communist countries, where the consequences of a ‘“new type”’ of poverty could be
extremely serious.21 And another issue is the fact that restructuring of large companies –
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7which mostly need to shed labor in order to become profitable – is slow or not taking place;
this means that potential unemployment increases are still very significant. A big threat in
this respect is the development of a “culture of unemployment.”
Strain should be linked also with an intense distribution struggle, and an erosion of
the consensus for societal change when many individuals appear as losers – once market
forces start to reward people in accordance with merit, effort, good ideas, and inspiration, but
also as a result of some workers’ misfortune to have jobs in unprofitable enterprises. This
also explains why some governments see inflation as a redistribution device when strain is
extreme.
There is another dimension to this distribution struggle which needs to be highlighted
for its exceptional character in human history, and for its effects on system transformation. It
is privatization, which means a total redistribution of state assets. As we know, economic
textbooks take as a given the initial distribution of assets among individual private owners;
this distribution is almost God given, and it underpins the whole reasoning on how best to
allocate resources and achieve Pareto optimality, or highest welfare. In the case of post-
Communist countries, “God” has decided to come down from heaven – for what we are
witnessing currently is an extraordinary process, without precedent in the history of mankind.
In the next few years, much of the fate of tens, if not hundreds, of millions of living
individuals, and of their descendants, is going to be shaped by the mechanics and dynamics
of privatization. What took many hundreds of years in the advanced capitalist countries is
supposed to occur in the post-Communist countries, through various procedures that are more
or less legal, in a snapshot on the scale of history. It is therefore not surprising that everything
surrounding this process is so emotionally charged– why so many hopes, dreams, reckless
and ruthless actions, misbehavior, and delusions are linked to it. All individuals want to be on
the winning side, but markets cannot make them all happy. The nature of capitalism in the
post-Communist countries will be decisively influenced by the actual results of privatization
as a process. If privatization results in the development of a strong middle class as the social
backbone of the new economic system, stability and vigor will be secured, and democratic
institutions will develop. Otherwise, the new system in the making will be inherently
unstable. This is why one needs to be careful in applying the logic of the Coase Theorem to
transition economies.22
There is a feature of Communism that needs to be emphasized in order to understand
better the social tension engendered by post-Communist transformation, and the intensity of
the distribution struggle. As an economic system, Communism functioned as a kind of poor
and steadily declining  “premature welfare state,”’23 suffering from economic euthanasia.  As
in Western countries, where powerful vested interests oppose economic adjustment,  those in
post-Communist countries who cannot compete on the markets have turned into a coalition of
interests that can slow down, or even arrest, reforms. This mass of individuals is most likely
to fall prey to populist slogans. Robert Gilpin’s observation, that adjustment is very difficult
in welfare states, applies mutatis mutandis in the case of post-Communist countries.24
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82. Judging Romania’s economic transition
2. 1  The burden of the past
In comparative analyses of the transition economies, insufficient attention has been paid
to the initial conditions prevailing when the transformation process got under way.25
Communist Romania, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, provides an interesting and
instructive case of immiserizing-growth which was caused by the logic of the system – in
particular, the rush to speed up industrial growth and to increase ties with market economies on
a very weak functional basis, by totally ignoring market mechanisms.  In the literature, this
phenomenon is explained by the existence of various price distortions which harm resource
allocation, worsen the terms of trade, and lower welfare.26  But it can also be argued that it was
the way the economy functioned as a whole, including the genesis of wrong industrial choices,
which constituted the distortion that led to immiserizing growth.  It has been shown that the
inner dynamics of the system – its incapacity to cope with increasing complexity and its inability
to assimilate and generate technological progress – led to a “softening” of output, characterized
by its expansion with a strong bias towards low value-added industrial goods, which led to a
steady deterioration of the terms of trade.27
Since immiserizing growth limited the potential to increase exports, the targeted trade
surpluses in the 1980s – required to pay back the external debt – were achieved through very
large cuts in hard currency imports.  Apart from the reduced level of investment, growth
possibilities were also impaired by a sharp reduction in imports of machinery and equipment
from the Western countries.  The heavy overtaxation of domestic absorption that took place
during this period subsequently resulted in lower growth rates of production, reduced welfare,
and bigger domestic imbalances, both visible and hidden.  In addition, shortages were rising in
both production and consumption. The immiserizing nature of “growth” in Communist Romania
is well illustrated by its income per capita, which has remained one of the lowest in Europe, and
the very high energy intensity of its GDP.28  Another telling fact is that whereas the GDP
allegedly grew by almost 28 per cent during the 1980s, exports decreased over the same period.
The structure of industry also revealed a strong bias towards the creation of gigantic
units, with no regard for the important sources of flexibility in an economy – namely,  the small
and medium-sized enterprises.  Thus, in 1989, 1,075 enterprises with more than 1,000
employees each represented more than 51 per cent of all units, provided jobs for 87 per cent of
all industrial workers, and supplied almost 85 per cent of all industrial output; enterprises with
over 3,000 workers, which accounted for about 16 per cent of the total, supplied over 50 per cent
of total industrial output and provided jobs for 53 per cent of all employees in industry.  At the
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9same time, the small and medium-sized enterprises, with less than 500 employees, accounted for
4 per cent of all workers and 6 per cent of total industrial output.
The forced reduction of the external debt in the 1980s, actually a sui generis shock-
therapy, accentuated the decline in the competitiveness of the economy, exacerbated imbalances
among sectors, increased shortages, and generally lowered the welfare of the people.
2.2  Output decline and high inflation period  (1990-199329): “The first
transformational recession”30
The early years of post-Communism in Romania were marred by severe economic
difficulties, including a very large fall in output (Table 1), an institutional interregnum,31 and
“systematic” policy incoherence.  “Institutional interregnum” refers to the melting down of
much of the old institutional structures without a rapid build up of market-based institutions (this
hiatus explains the implosion of public revenues as well – see table 2).  This, obviously,
contributed to increasing uncertainty, fuzziness, and volatility in the national economic
environment.  At this stage the inherited structures are being broken, which means that the
quantity of friction in the system goes up considerably and important resources are consumed in
order to accommodate change.  A lot boils down to a change of the organizational behavior of
actors, to the build-up of new organizational capital.  In this phase of transition, there exists a
territory over which market co-ordination failures combine with an “abandoned child” feeling of
many enterprises, which are no longer able to rely on central allocation of resources and
customers.32  For these enterprises, information and transaction costs skyrocketed.33
In spite of its tortuous path, some institutional change did take place during those years,
through spontaneous processes such as massive land privatization and the emergence of a
private sector, which preceded Law 54 in 1990 on the setting up of private enterprises,34 as well
as through measures “from above” initiated by the Government.  Among the latter were the start
of the two-tiered banking system in 1990, the commercialization of state-owned enterprises by
Law 15 in 1990, and the privatization Law 58 in 1991, which aimed to give 30 per cent of the
equity of commercial companies to Romanian citizens.35  What happened with the privatization
law is symptomatic of the vacillations and inconsistencies of reform policies during that period;
Law 58 in 1991 created much confusion regarding the actual structure of property rights and the
need for better management of assets.
Overall, and in a formal sense, it can be said that policy-makers practiced a sort of
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“institutional mimicking” by trying to adopt, although in a highly inconsistent way, institutions
found in the Western world.  A problem with institutional mimicking, however, is that it cannot
deal with the fine print of reforms and institutional change,  and frequently lacks substance,
since the real functioning of institutions is driven by vested interests.
After December 1989, there was tremendous pressure from below to consume tradables,
to reduce exports and boost imports of both consumer and intermediate goods after the years of
severe deprivation in the 1980s.  The switch in favor of tradables was almost instantaneous and
virtually unstoppable; it was also strengthened by a “shunning of domestic goods” syndrome.  In
1990 the boost in consumption was financed primarily by dissaving, or the depletion of foreign
exchange reserves.
However, there is another side of the story that needs to be highlighted – namely, that
policy-makers complicated the state of the economy both by commission and omission.  By
commission, since they faltered in the face of pressures from below and were influenced also by
the prospect of elections in May 1990.  This resulted in the concession of large wage rises36 and
the introduction of the five-day work week, despite the fact that output was plummeting,
together with the maintenance of wide-ranging price controls, a greatly overvalued exchange
rate, and mismanagement of the foreign exchange reserves.  By omission, for there were no
serious attempts to deal with macroeconomic imbalances before November 1990.  Events during
that year revealed a fundamental flaw in the transformation process, namely, the considerable
decision-making power of enterprises when they do not face hard-budget constraints.
Confronted with a rapid deterioration of the economy and unable to contain growing
disequilibria, including unsustainable trade deficits, rising prices, and vanishing investment, a
stabilization plan supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was introduced at the
start of 1991.37  The middle-of-the-road, gradualistic stabilization program that took shape
included a tightening of fiscal and monetary policy, although real interest rates remained highly
negative; a tax-based incomes policy; a new devaluation; and the introduction of a two-tier
exchange rate system through the initiation of an inter-bank foreign exchange auction system in
February 1991.  The program failed to stop inflation.
At the end of 1991, there were growing tensions in the system:  an overvalued official
exchange rate; artificially low prices for energy and raw materials which encouraged their over-
consumption; and insufficient inflows of foreign capital to compensate for the low levels of
domestic saving and the weakness of fixed investment.  Many exporters and importers found a
way out of the impasse in making barter deals, which introduced an implicit exchange rate into
the functioning of the economy; this rate mitigated the pernicious effects of overvaluation, but
entailed considerable information and transaction costs.  However, capital flight and insufficient
exports were becoming matters of major concern.
In the spring of 1992, policy-makers were compelled to act.  Interest rates were raised
considerably and the refinance rate of the National Bank reached 80 percent; the exchange rate
was devalued substantially and exporters were granted full retention rights in the hope of
overcoming their mistrust of policy-makers and encouraging the repatriation of capital.  The full
retention measure was thought necessary, since enterprises still had a vivid memory of the
                                                       
    
36This development should be seen in the context of the elections in May 1990.  Measured real wages rose by 11
per cent between December 1989 and October 1990, while output continued to fall.  The removal of price controls
began in November of that year.
    
37See also D. G. Demakas and M. S. Khan, “The Romanian Economic Reform Program.”  IMF Occasional
Paper.  No. 89 (1991).
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“confiscation” of their hard-currency holdings at the end of 1991.  But the policy turnaround
was incomplete, and interest rates remained negative as a result of a large array of preferential
credits and very low deposit rates, the latter maintaining a high propensity to shun the domestic
currency in favor of the dollar.  Political factors, resulting from the elections of September 1992,
also weakened the determination of the government to pursue a consistent policy.
Table 1     Macroeconomic Indicators, 1990-99
Indicators 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999+
1.GDP (annual change) -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.6 - 7..3 - 4.5
2. Unemployment rate
(end of period)
- 3 8.2 10.4 10.9 9.5 6.6 8.8 10.3 11.5
3.Inflation
   -average
   -Dec./Dec.
5.1
37.7
170.2
222.8
210.4
199.2
256.1
295.5
136.7
61.7
32.3
27.8
38.8
56.9
154.8
151.4
59.1
40.6 44
4.M2 (end of period)-
growth rate
22 101.2 79.6 141 138.1 71.6 66 104.9 48..9
5. Nominal devaluation
   -average
   -Dec./Dec.
50.3
140.4
240.5
444.5
303.1
143.3
146.8
177.4
117.8
38.4
22.8
45.9
51.6
56.5
132.5
98.8
23.8
36.5
6.M2/GDP 55.7 27.4 20.1 13.8 13.3 18.1 20.5 18.1
7.Budget deficit/GDP 1.0 3.3 -4.6 -0.4 -1.9 -2.6 - 3.9 -3.7 - 3..3 - 4.0
8.Current account/GDP -8.5 -3.5 -8 -4.5 -1.4 -5 -7.2 -6.7 - 7.5 - 6.0
9.Real wage index 5.1 -18.3 -13.0 -16.7 0.4 2.6 9.5 -22.2 6
*
 Consolidated budget     +estimates
**
 Exchange rate variation deflated by the ratio between Romanian PPI and USA PPI
Source: National Bank of Romania
Table 2  : Government Revenues (Total Revenue) for Several Transition Economies,
1990-1996
In percent of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
ROMANIA 39.7 41.9 37.4 33.9 32.1 31.9 29.6
ALBANIA 46.8 31.5 23.5 25.6 24.5 24.0 ...
BULGARIA 52.9 40.4 38.4 37.2 39.9 36.2 33.6
CZECH REPUBLIC ... ... 48.2 50.5 49.4 48.4 ...
HUNGARY 52.1 50.9 50.0 50.7 49.6 46.6 45.8
POLAND 45.4 42.4 43.9 47.6 47.2 47.2 45.7
SLOVAK REPUBLIC ... ... 46.1 44.2 46.3 46.8 ...
Sources: Country authorities; and IMF estimates.
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2. 3  A policy breakthrough, 1993-1994: “the interest rate shock”
Rising inflation and the persistence of a large trade imbalance eventually forced a
reconsideration of policies.  A breakthrough occurred in the last quarter of 1993, when several
key decisions were made in order to contain and reverse the dynamics of inflationary
expectations, to start the remonetization of the economy, and to create a transparent, functioning
foreign exchange market.  A major omission in the strategy, however, was a more clear
definition of property rights under privatization,   which could have had a major influence on the
size of capital inflows and on the scope and intensity of restructuring.
The main decision, a dramatic rise in nominal interest rates, led to positive real interest
rates.  Thus, the National Bank’s average refinancing rate rose from an annual rate of 59.1 per
cent in September 1993 to 136.3 per cent in January 1994, and remained at that level for another
three months.  Commercial banks’ lending rates followed suit with a two-month lag.  This
measure had two major consequences: first, it stemmed the flight from the leu and started a rapid
rate of remonetization, and second, it greatly helped the formation of a transparent foreign
exchange market and thereby strengthened the potential for an export drive.  The scale of
remonetization explains why the policy shock of 1994 did not lead to a decline of output, as was
the case in 1997, when the economy was subject to a credit crunch.  Another key decision was
the substantial devaluation in several stages of the official inter-bank market exchange rate,
which lowered it to more or less the rate prevailing on the gray market; this also increased the
transparency of the foreign exchange market, which in turn considerably reduced the entry costs
for those in need of foreign exchange. The third measure involved a stricter control of base
money, and, consequently, a reduced rate of money creation.  And finally, the fiscal stance was
tightened to aim toward a lower budget deficit, when corrected for the removal of some explicit
and implicit subsidies.38
The results of this policy breakthrough were much as expected.  Inflation fell to an
annual rate of 62 per cent (December on December) in 1994, and there was a large reduction in
the trade deficit to $411 million.39  The economy absorbed the shock of high positive real
interest rates and of the exchange rate unification – which meant the suppression of some
implicit and explicit subsidies to inefficient producers – and there was no decline of output.  The
removal of implicit subsidies explains why the budget deficit went up to 4.3 per cent in 1994,
with a large part of its financing being obtained from external sources.
The export drive played a major role in the recovery, but it cannot explain why so many
enterprises in the weak sectors also did well in 1993, especially as arrears did not “appear” to be
rising sharply in 1994.40  Several explanations can be suggested.  One is the existence of
important market imperfections, such as monopolies that can extract rents and which operate in
the less efficient sectors.  Another is that there are huge amounts of “X-inefficiency” in the
system. This means that potential micro-efficiency gains are ubiquitous and that, when under
pressure, even firms in the backward sectors can realize some of them and cope with the
situation.  But accepting this explanation requires an evaluation of the resilience of
organizational routines in the system.  An implication of the X-inefficiency explanation is that
                                                       
    
38The budget deficit was actually higher in 1994 (4.3 per cent) than in 1993 (1.7 per cent), but many implicit and
explicit subsidies had been removed, which was a key objective.
    
39It can be argued, however, that the ceteris paribus condition does not apply in this assessment since there were
favorable external ‘“shocks”’ as well.
    
40Caution is required with the numbers since arrears can be obscured by inefficient activities being kept afloat
by bank lending (via rollovers).  Ultimately, these “hidden” arrears will show up in a deterioration in the
portfolios of the banks.  This is what appears to have happened in 1996 and thereafter.
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the pressure for fundamental restructuring begins to bite only when most of the efficiency
reserves are exhausted.  A third explanation is that there was more reliance on self-financing,
although in fact many companies were plagued by a lack of working capital.  Last, but not least,
unwarranted bank lending, such as rollover of loans, may have played a significant role in
supporting the weaker enterprises.
2. 4   Fragile growth and relapse into inflation, 1995-1996
There was a rapid growth of GDP in Romania in 1995: 7.1 per cent as against just under
4 per cent in 1994 and under 2 per cent in 1993.  At the same time, the inflation rate at the end of
1995 was about 28 per cent.  The remonetization of the economy continued, as indicated by the
71 per cent expansion of the money supply,  far exceeding the rate of inflation (Table 1). While
exports continued to grow rapidly, by over 20 per cent, imports increased by more than 30 per
cent, causing the trade imbalance to increase again to more than $1,200 million and putting
pressure on the foreign exchange inter-bank market.
What caused the trade imbalance to deteriorate again, bearing in mind that the real
exchange rate did not appreciate in 1995,  and that there were no major changes in the terms of
trade in this period?  One explanation is that an import and consumer spending boom started in
the last months of 1994, which, arguably, might have been encouraged by perceptions that the
exchange rate was unsustainable.  But this explanation would have to be reconciled with the fact
that in 1994 the trade and current account imbalances improved dramatically and the foreign
exchange reserves of the banking system, including the Central Bank,  increased substantially,
which might have suggested that the exchange rate was in fact sustainable.  It is also possible
that the various economic agents were unused to the stability of the nominal exchange rate and
therefore anticipated an inevitable depreciation, which, paradoxically, may not have been
justified by the economic fundamentals.  Another conjecture is that some of the improvement in
the trade balance in 1994 was caused by temporary factors; their removal in the following year
then put additional pressure on an exchange rate that was already overvalued.  Without
dismissing these factors, the more important explanation is probably that the higher growth rate
of the economy, driven by highly import-dependent branches, led to overheating and the rapid
growth of imports.
There was a clear link between inflation and the way the budget deficit was financed in
1996.  Whereas the target for the consolidated budget deficit was 2.2 per cent, it turned out to be
5.7 per cent, on an accrual basis.  More significant was that its financing was inflationary. The
scale of inflationary financing was augmented by the injection of base money in order to cover
the quasi-fiscal deficit that arose because of the losses of agriculture and of the régies
autonomes.  Together with the quasi-fiscal deficit, the fiscal imbalance  reached 8.4 per cent on
an accrual basis in 1996 (Table 3).
Remonetization had supported the efforts to subdue inflation in 1994 and 1995.
Regarding remonetization, several aspects should be emphasized:
a) it facilitated the subsidization of various sectors of the economy, including agriculture
and energy, from the Central Bank’s resources, allowing the Central Bank to simultaneously
pursue the reduction of inflation.  The sectoral financing mirrored the existence of major
structural disequilibria in the economy.
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b) it “helped” put off dealing resolutely with the two failed banks, Dacia Felix and Credit
Bank.  More then 1,700 billion lei (c. $400 million) were injected in both through special credits
during 1995-1996.  If money demand had not grown for most of 1995 and 1996, the size of
special credits would have certainly fuelled inflation.  The reason for this injection was that there
was no insurance scheme for small depositors, and so it was felt necessary to forestall a run on
the banks and a possible systemic crisis.
c)  it involved the expansion of base money through the increase of net domestic assets,
and not through the accumulation of net foreign assets.  Ideally, remonetization should have
taken place as an outcome of a rise in net foreign assets – that is, as a result of capital inflows or
of net exports, and not, primarily, via base money injections which supported the expansion of
domestic credit.
d) it can be argued that this remonetization slowed down the development of monetary
policy instruments, namely open market operations.  This is because the Central Bank did not
face the pressure to cope with a surge of liquidity as would have been the case with substantial
capital inflows.  The main reasons why such inflows did not occur are the feeble pace of
privatization during 1994-1996, the primitive domestic capital markets, and the credibility
problem surrounding domestic policies.
By the end of 1996 several worrying tendencies had emerged: a very sharp rise in the
monthly inflation rate which was in double-digits in the last quarter of the year; the sharp rise in
the trade and current account deficits, although the growth rate of GDP was lower than in 1995,
at3.9 per cent as against 7.1 per cent; and still greater distortions in relative prices, due especially
to the delay in adjusting energy prices and to the administrative control of the exchange rate. As
the remonetization process came to a halt in the latter half of 1996, maintaining subsidies
without igniting inflation was to prove an impossible endeavor. Overall, the macroeconomic
stabilization program was losing steam.  The inflation rate at the end of the year was 57 per cent.
Furthermore, in spite of heavy borrowing (over $1.5 billion) on the international capital
markets,41 the foreign exchange reserves of the National Bank stood at about $700 million at the
end of 1996.  The external debt of the country was rising rapidly, with peak payments looming
in the following years.  In addition, the policy mix being pursued by the Government – multiple
exchange rates, price controls, subsidies, and so on – was making it unlikely that it would be
possible to reach a new arrangement with the IMF.  Such developments were clearly leading to a
dead-end and a policy change was urgently required.
The events of 1995 and 1996 underscored both the importance of privatization for
inducing autonomous capital inflows and for enhancing restructuring, as well as the danger of
“populist macroeconomics”.42
                                                       
    
41During 1995, Romania was rated BB- by the principal Western rating agencies (and BB+ by JCRA), which
helped the raising of money on the international capital markets.  These accommodating capital inflows fended
off a major balance of payments crisis in 1996.
    
42The elections of 1996 clearly had an impact on macroeconomic policy, and, subsequently, on the
performance of the economy.
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Table 3. Fiscal and Quasi-Fiscal Deficits
As per cent share in GDP
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Budget balance
Total
     Cash -0.4 -1.9 -2.6 -3.9 -4.5
     Accruals -0.4 -1.9 -3.0 -5.8 -3.5
Primary
     Cash 80.6 -0.5 -1.2 -2.2 -0.5
     Accruals 0.6 -0.5 -1.6 -4.1 0.5
Quasi-fiscal deficit
NBR refinancing
-3.1 -3.6 -0.3 -2.6 0.0
Budget balance including quasi-fiscal deficit
Total
     Cash -3.5 2-5.5 -2.9 -6.5 -4.5
     Accruals -3.5 -5.5 -3.3 -8.4 -3.5
Primary
     Cash -2.5 -4.1 -1.5 -4.8 -0.5
Accruals -2.5 -4.1 -1.9 -6.7 0.5
Memorandum item:
2
Interest payment 0.9 1.4 1.4 1.7 4
Source: National Bank of Romania
2. 5   The “policy shock” of 1997 (the second “transformational recession”)
The new government’s first step was to liberalize the foreign exchange market and other
prices which were still administratively regulated.  Paradoxically, in a year when renewed
efforts were made to achieve macroeconomic stabilization, the expected annual inflation rate of
90 per cent was much higher than that of 1996 (57 per cent).  The explanation is in the
magnitude of the effect of liberalizing prices and the anticipated devaluation of the leu.43  The
assault upon several of the major imbalances led to some positive results: the foreign exchange
market began to function adequately; the consolidated budget deficit, including formerly quasi-
fiscal operations,  was reduced to 3.7 per cent of GDP;44 the current account deficit shrank a
little, from 7.2 per cent to 6.6 per cent of GDP; and the Central Bank’s foreign exchange
reserves soared to about $2.6 billion.45  The size of the fiscal adjustment should also be seen
against the backdrop of the sharp fall in output, which reduced the tax base considerably.
But there was a dark side to the story : the actual inflation rate was 151 per cent and the
GDP fell by much more than expected (-6.6 per cent as against -2 per cent).   Policy-induced
demand and supply shocks lie behind the plunge of the economy; they explain the start of the
                                                       
    
43From some 4,000 lei/$1 at the end of December 1996, the rate rose sharply to about 9,000 lei/$1 in late
February 1997, after which a nominal appreciation took place and the rate stabilized at around 7,000 lei/$1.
    
44This is an overstatement to the extent that arrears stood at a high level.  The bail-out of Banca Agricola and
Bancorex in 1997 indicated how serious the problem of arrears was, and how they can obscure quasi-fiscal
deficits.
    
45Significant amounts of portfolio capital entered the country, which tested the ability of the Central Bank to
sterilize them when base money represented no more then 4.6-4.7 per cent of GDP.
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second “transformational recession.”
Another consequence of the program was its severe impact on the emerging private
sector.  The large contraction of real credit considerably lowered  the prospects for many small
and medium-sized companies, and was a major factor in the fall of output.  Thus, total real credit
(in domestic and foreign currency) declined by 52.5 per cent, and its non-government
component by as much as 61.3 per cent.  This should be set against the growth of real credit in
previous years, when the non-government component increased by 19.7 per cent, 35.6 per cent,
and 4.1 per cent in 1994, 1995, and 1996 respectively.46  In many sectors sales fell by 20-25 per
cent.  This development was the reason behind the growing chorus of demands in the private
sector for fiscal relaxation, demands that became very intense during 1998.  Ironically, a
program that was meant to advance reforms negatively affected the emerging entrepreneurial
class, and encouraged the expansion of the underground economy because of the degree of
austerity involved. Appendix 3 illustrates how both over-regulation and under-regulation are bad
for the economy; just as over-regulation stimulates the underground sector, in a similar way it
can impact a sharp decline of the economy, for many firms will try to get in the “shady area” of
business for the sake of preserving some revenue streams. The expansion of the underground
economy would be a response to a powerful shock. As thermodynamics tells us, “nothing gets
lost in the universe”.
There are several factors that explain the high inflation.  First, the corrective component
of inflation – price de-control, plus a rise in some administered prices – came strongly into play
in March, when inflation reached almost 30 per cent.  Secondly, there was a substantial
overshooting of the leu.  Thirdly, the program underestimated the role of monopolies and the
slow response of supply as sources of inflation.  Another factor lay in the economic policy
slippage in the latter half of the year, when there was a premature relaxation of monetary policy:
there was an extensive and abrupt wage indexation, redundancy payments were granted to laid-
off workers, and large amounts of money were pumped into banks that were in difficulty.  It was
obvious that the macroeconomic policy mix was not well balanced, and that the supply side
response had been greatly overestimated.
The restructuring of major “producers” of arrears was inadequate.  The delay was due to
the inherent problems of such an operation when the economy was in steep decline; on the one
hand, the overall measures aimed at restructuring implied the need for layoffs, but on the other
hand, the troubles confronting the small and medium-sized enterprises in the private sector, a
direct consequence of the austerity measures, were discouraging the creation of new job
opportunities.  Privatization of large enterprises dragged and bank privatization was left in
abeyance.  Such a situation could not provide incentives for foreign direct investment nor
promote restructuring.
In the last quarter of the year, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance converted
8,000 billion lei ($1 billion) of poor credits granted by the Agricultural Bank and Bancorex into
government bonds as a way of recapitalizing the two banks.  While the Dacia Felix and the
Credit Bank failures were caused by large-scale fraud and embezzlement, the failure of the state
banks was the result of a chronic misallocation of resources and of poor performance in a
number of large economic sectors, which in turn was due to slow restructuring and feeble capital
inflows.47
                                                       
    
46National Bank of Romania data.
    
47Behind these developments was the slow pace of privatization, which therefore failed to attract capital
inflows and  help restructuring.
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The GDP continued its decline in 1998, falling by 7.3 percent, and, at year-end,
unemployment stood at about 10 per cent as against 6.6 per cent in December 1996.    Inflation
year-on-year fell to 40.6 per cent, and the consolidated budget deficit,   including privatization
revenues, was 3.3 per cent.  The latter should be seen against the background of a further
reduction of the tax base because of the fall in output, and the implications for government
spending of the rescue package for the two state-owned banks.  Actually, the budget deficit was
kept under control by a very severe cut in public expenditure which was undertaken in August.
Although they came down during the year, real interest rates stayed high in 1998,48 as a
result of tight monetary conditions and a lack of sufficient policy credibility.  Their level
indicated how little room to maneuver was available to policy-makers.  Interestingly, real credit
started to grow again in 1998, although output did not.  Between December 1997 and November
1998, real domestic credit rose by some 24 per cent, with the non-government component
increasing even more.  A note of caution is needed here, however, since over the same period,
the net foreign assets of the banking system fell by almost  one half and the real money supply
shrank (see Table 1), which  indicates no resumption of remonetization.
Based on consumer prices, the exchange rate appreciated in real terms by about 30 per
cent since mid-1997, after the sharp devaluation at the start of that year, which helps to explain
the rising trade and current account deficits in 1998.  The foreign exchange reserves of the
National Bank declined to less than $1.9 billion at the end of the year, a result of its interventions
to stem the fall of the leu.  Excessively lax income policy also helps to explain the size of
domestic absorption in a year when there was a further contraction of output.  Real wages
actually grew by about 6 per cent in the year to December  (Table 1).
The fallout from the financial crisis in Russia led to the postponement of new external
bond issues, and cast doubt on the possibility of rolling over a portion of the external debt in
1999.  Because of the size of payments due in 1999, about $2.9 billion, there was threat of a
financial crisis and default.  This threat explains the considerable efforts to conclude
privatization deals at the end of 1998 – for example, Romtelecom and  Romanian Development
Bank – and the attempt to close down large loss-making companies.
2.6  A comparison of two stabilization programs: 1994-1995 and 1997-       
1998
There are several features which differentiate the two attempts at macroeconomic
stabilization in 1994-1995 (hereafter policy A) and in 1997-1998 (policy B).  These differences
help to explain why output grew, albeit on a very fragile basis, during the first attempt, whereas
it declined in 1997 and 1998.  It should be stressed that in both cases the pace of restructuring
was inadequate. However, policy B tried explicitly to combine measures aiming at reducing
macroeconomic disequilibria with structural reforms, which explains the pains and difficulties of
the program.
Both policies were accompanied by interest-rate shocks.  However, policy A did not
involve a credit crunch; on the contrary, M2 grew rapidly and so did lending.  This was due to
the rapid remonetization of the economy, which was enhanced by a psychological factor: for the
first time, because of positive real interest rates, people found it worthwhile to put their savings
                                                       
    
48In the second half of the year, ex post US dollar returns on three-month T-bills hovered at about 50 per cent.
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into banks.  Consequently, bank deposits grew rapidly.  The psychological-cum-savings
reorientation factors were no longer strong in the second period, and the sharp rise in interest
rates in 1997 could not be accompanied by remonetization.  Policy B, as a matter of fact,
involved a major credit crunch.
Since remonetization came to a halt in the second half of 1996 this created a major
constraint for policy in 1997.  The increase in the velocity of money forced policy-makers to
consider a much tighter monetary policy.  The issue at stake was how much tighter it should be.
Policy B involved exchange rate unification via a large overshooting of the leu, which
magnified inflation and the decline of real money balances; it also contained a sharp rise in the
price of energy as a key relative price, which affected heavily energy-guzzling sectors.  Policy A
included multiple exchange rates and controls on key prices such as energy.
Policy B involved a major fiscal adjustment, including a large reduction in explicit and
implicit subsidies, which affected certain sectors more heavily than others; in the budget,
subsidies went down from over 6 percent in 1996 to 2.5 percent in 1997.
Policy B used as a nominal anchor base money, which actually recovered its 1996
December level in the second quarter of 1997.  Policy A was quite eclectic, relying on both the
control of the money supply and a certain degree of stability in the exchange rate49 during the
phase of intense remonetization.
Macroeconomic imbalances persisted, or even developed, over the 1994-1996 period.
Arrears rose to over 34 per cent of GDP in 1996, from an average of 22-23 per cent in previous
years.  This was increasingly worrisome, since, as the economy had been growing, restructuring
should have been encouraged.  Policy-makers underestimated the need for a restructuring policy,
an industrial policy conceived as a damage-control device.50  The growth of arrears indicated the
unsound basis of economic growth.  The rising trade deficits in 1995 and 1996 were financed by
substantial compensating capital inflows, which created a dangerous situation for the following
years.  With the benefit of hindsight, one can imagine various scenarios against the backdrop of
the world financial crisis.
Policy B tried to speed up privatization and used the Stock Market to this end.  This
explains the large inflows of portfolio capital in the first half of 1997 and the accumulation of
foreign exchange reserves by the Central Bank.  In 1997 Romania, for the first time, received
substantial autonomous capital inflows, which tested the sterilization capacity of the central
bank.  These flows later subsided as policy ran into an impasse.
An apparent puzzle comes out of comparing the two programs.  During 1994-1996, the
trade and the current account deficits rose in the wake of the expanding economy.  With the very
severe compression of domestic absorption in 1997 and 1998, an improvement in the current
account deficit might have been expected.  There was a slight reduction of the deficit in 1997 (as
against 1996), but it started to grow again in 1998. The immediate explanation is linked with the
real appreciation of the exchange rate and lax income policy in 1998.
                                                       
    
49The plural “exchange rates” is emphasized, since a de facto quasi-unification of the rates occurred during
1994.  The relative stability of the rates helped the stabilization effort at that time.
    
50An industrial policy, seen as managing the gradual phasing-out of chronically inefficient companies, was
advocated in D. Daianu, “Transformation and the Legacy of Backwardness.” Économies et Sociétés.  No.44
(1992), pp. 181-206.   the volume number is required.
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Whether the fall in output could have been smaller, or even avoided, in 1997 can only be
a matter for speculation.  It is clear nonetheless that, owing to very tight credit conditions, a
continuation of growth was hardly possible and this is why the program anticipated a decline of
2 per cent in GDP.  One policy issue for analysis is the appropriateness of the nominal reduction
of base money in the first quarter of 1997, instead, for instance, of keeping Mo fixed for a while.
The reasons for this reduction – a rising money velocity and the desire to mitigate the size of the
correction in the price level – are plausible, but not indisputable.  In addition, the appropriateness
of moving at the same time on two tracks – the cut in Mo and floating the exchange rate – can be
questioned. Thus, the floating of the exchange rate could have followed the correction of the
inflationary surge that had been set off by the too rapid expansion of base money in late 1996.
There might also have been a closer and more critical look at the size of tariff reductions
proposed for agriculture.  The conclusion is that policy-makers underestimated the scale and
extent of supply rigidities in the economy.
As for the 1994-1995 program, it should again be emphasized that the slow pace of
privatization and restructuring damaged its effectiveness.  A faster rate of privatization, and
consequently more capital inflows, especially of FDI, could have significantly changed the
structure of the economy.  Even if the then Government had not allowed the official exchange
rate to float, a dual system – a commercial rate with rationing, and a free rate for financial
transactions – could have created an exit window for potential foreign investors in the local
equity market.  The Government could have used the favorable circumstances of an expanding
economy to deal with large loss-making units.
2.7   What next?
The year 1999 highlighted three major interlinked threats and policy challenges:  the risk
of external payment default;51 the danger of a banking crisis, owing to the scale of bad loans in
the banking system and the size of the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank, which were
less than base money and insufficient to stem a run on banks;52 and a possible financial crisis as
a result of persistently high real interest rates and the consequences of bail-outs in the banking
system.  Other important constraints on policy were social and policy fatigue,53 and an
increasingly unfavorable external environment.
The stand-by agreement with the IMF, signed in August, validates a deficit of 3.8
percent, including privatization revenues of 1 percent. The big unknown in the whole picture,
however, is the real quasi-fiscal deficit in the economy, which is obscured by arrears and the
accumulation of bad loans to enterprises.  What happened with Bancorex and Banca Agricola is
an illustration of the result of years of weak restructuring, which shows up in the balance sheets
of the banks54 and, ultimately, in the consolidated budget deficit – when the “day of reckoning”
cannot be postponed any longer.
                                                       
    
51Despite its moderate level (of about 25 per cent of GDP), the external debt has nevertheless been increasing
rapidly.
    
52At the start of 1998, the $500 limit to the purchase of hard currency by individuals was lifted.  This measure
can enhance a run on the banking system. However, the lack of a collective experience of a banking system
collapse can act as a cushion against such a run.
    
53The result of an austerity policy underway for almost three years, in which GDP has fallen by more than 18
percent.
    
54According to data made public by the National Bank, non-performing loans were above 60 percent  of total
outstanding loans in June 1998, with much of it belonging to the large state owned banks.
20
The Government was able to cope with the peak payments of May and June and avoided
an external default. Since the end of July, the reserves of the National Bank have been on the
rise, which is a positive development that needs to be judged in conjunction with a considerable
reduction of the trade imbalance. In this context, one has to highlight the considerable reduction
of the share of energy-intensive products in the structure of exports; this suggests that the rise in
the relative price of energy, in 1997, has had positive reverberations.
The pains for the Government of implementing its economic program stem from the
requirements to keep the consolidated budget deficit under control, as well as to  find resources
to finance substantial restructuring in the banking sector in a year when the GDP is expected to
fall again.  The tension in the execution of the budget is illustrated by the dynamic of interest
payments, which climbed to almost 6 percent of GDP in 1999, or 1/3 of the state budget
expenditure, –whereas a few years ago interest payments stood below 2 percent (see Table 4). A
substantial part of this debt service is due to recent banks’ bailouts. Comparing this number with
the targeted budget deficit shows that only a rising primary surplus helped to keep the budget
deficit under control.
A major objective of macroeconomic policy for the next period, the year 2000 included,
is to bring real interest rates down; this would reduce the debt service dramatically. As a matter
of fact, a reduction of the debt service by 1/3 could help further reduce the budget deficit,
simultaneously with increasing capital expenditure, which would signal a significant change in
budget policy. To this end, the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank, using, inter alia,
external finance, need to find ways to fight the “rent” commercial banks extract from financing
the budget deficit.
Table 5: Public Debt Service Strains the Budget
1997 1998 1999*
Consolidated budget         -3.6         -3.3          -3.8
Interest payments          3.4          5.4            6.1
Balance net of privatization
revenues
       -4.6        -5.6          -6.3
Primary balance         -0.1         2.1           2.8
Source: National Statistics’; * MOF estimates
The policy fight to reduce real interest rates can be viewed from several perspectives: the
need per se to cut the deficit in order to reduce crowding-out and stimulate the expansion of the
private sector; the need to resume growth on a sustainable basis; the need to assign resources for
restructuring the banking sector; and the need to allocate resources for pension sector reform
Growth resumption can happen next year, and it can last should macroeconomic policy
be sensible and not succumb to populistic temptations; this turnaround is important for arresting
a steady decline of national gross saving; which was about 8 percent in 1998 and, it is estimated,
goes down to below 5 percent this year.55 This reduction of saving was mirrored by a dramatic
diminution of gross national investment: a decline to 17.7 percent in 1998 and, it is estimated, to
about 10 percent in 1999. Certainly one has to offer a caveat in this respect in view of the major
changes in relative prices in 1997, which must have influenced investment decisions. But it is
obvious that the compression of economic activity had an impact on gross saving and
                                                       
    
55This jump is mirrored by the rise of the share of final consumption in the GDP in the last couple of years.
Actually, such big changes in the shares of consumption and investment occurred only in 1990, when formerly
repressed consumption came into the open.
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investment. Since running very large current account deficits is not a realistic option for the
future, the way to achieve a higher rate of capital formation is to enhance a higher saving ratio –
and this hinges on sustainable growth resumption which, further, depends on export orientation.
It is urgent that a public debt strategy be put in place. On one hand, Romania needs it
under any circumstances. On the other hand, the external payments coming due in 1999 ask for a
coherent policy in order to attract financial resources from abroad. There are possibilities that the
Government does not appear to have sufficiently explored, particularly at a time when one
should try to find a collateral in order to reduce the spreads Romania meets on capital markets.
Such possibilities are convertible bonds, pre-financing schemes, and credit enhancement. This
author does not see, for instance, how the World Bank could reject a demand for credit
enhancement by the Romanian government, or by a Romanian commercial entity such as
Petrom.  These possibilities could bring in hundreds of millions of USD, at a more reasonable
cost,  in a period of continuing pressure exerted by due external payments.
One needs to break a vicious circle currently at play in the Romanian economy. Thus,
economic decline plus the reduction of investment, including the slow pace of capital inflows,
do not favor upgrading the structure of output and of exports, and they also badly damage public
investment in human capital. Likewise, the export barrier and the demand for resources for
restructuring in the banking sector and for pension reform in turn maintain a precarious
financing of external imbalances, and entail a rapidly growing public debt.  This further saps
growth prospects. Instead, should economic growth resume against the background of lower
budget deficits, lower quasi-fiscal deficits, lower real interest rates, more capital inflows, and a
competitive exchange rate, it could bring about a virtuous circle. Further privatization plays an
essential role to this end.
3.  Conclusion
The freeing of prices and the functional opening of the economy put the latter under
tremendous strain when resource reallocation cannot take place quickly enough and without
friction. Strain is augmented by congenital institutional fragility.
The magnitude of the required resource reallocation (strain) and disorganization can
seriously undermine the attempt to pursue a low inflation rate in the short run – particularly if
the lack of capital markets, the presence of large and growing budget deficits, low savings rates,
and meager foreign capital inflows and external aid are taken into account.  In a system subject
to substantial strain, there are strong forces that create a high propensity to generate inflation as
a way of diffusing tension, by spreading out, or putting off, the costs of adjustment; other effects
of strain are massive inter-enterprise rrears, which appear as a sui generis and unintended
financial innovation, creating a structural trap for stabilization policy.  The inflation tax and
negative real interest rates are implicit subsidies for those that are unable to make ends meet
financially in a competitive environment.
Analysts have frequently highlighted the better financial discipline in countries such as
Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, as compared with the Russian Federation, Ukraine, or
Romania. It is suggested here that an explanation is provided by looking at the structure of the
former economies,56 their ability to export to Western markets and to attract foreign investment,
                                                       
    
56A World Bank study shows the median number of employees in a sample of firms in Romania to be 1,327,
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their size, their economic policies, and not least, their geography.  Furthermore, structure is
influenced by whether or not there was a history of partial reforms that, in some cases, brought
about several of the ingredients of a market environment, the degree of concentration of
industry, and the prior existence of a private sector.57
Policy credibility can be singled out as a major explanatory factor, but credibility itself
depends on how much structural adjustment can be brought about by that policy over a stated
period.  The capacity to adjust is influenced in turn by the initial structure and the scale of
resource misallocation that it contains.
If it is accepted that the roots of financial in-discipline and economic performance are to
be sought in structure – however multifaceted – and the strain to which the economy is
subjected, the obvious conclusion is that both structure and strain have to be targeted by policy.
Dealing with structure includes a focus on both property rights and corporate governance.  Also,
attention must be paid to the development of appropriate and effective market institutions, and to
finding ways to erode the existing economic power structure and to change enterprise behavior.
Strain, which reflects the scale of the required resource reallocation, should be approached by
starting with the simple truth that structural adjustment is always difficult, even in an advanced
market-based economy and even when reform is credible.58
The Romanian experience is a glaring example of the importance of structural reforms,
of reducing the structural distortions of the economy for durable macroeconomic stabilization.
At the same time, it is proof of the pains of such reforms. Unless financial discipline is imposed
in the form of hard budget constraints, the pressure on the central bank, and on the banking
sector in general, becomes a constant feature of the way the system does function, which
proliferates into wide-ranging rent-seeking and demands for cheap credit.  Here one sees the
combination of the pressures exerted by those who cannot pay at the new relative prices, with
that of those who do not wish to pay, since ‘“it pays not to pay.”’ Another lesson of this
experience is the link between privatization, capital inflows in the form of foreign direct
investment, and restructuring. With the benefit of hindsight, it can be asserted that the magnitude
of required resource reallocation assigns a special role to foreign capital in helping reallocate
resources and in imposing financial discipline in the system.
Where policy is inconsistent, privatization is slow, and foreign direct investment is non-
significant, high strain persists; it undermines macroeconomic stabilization and preserves the
flow problem of the banking industry. Here, a dangerous vicious circle can be at work between
macroeconomic policy and the state of the banking system. Thus, unless there is deep
restructuring of the economy, both tightening and expansionary policies can be ambivalent as to
their impact on banks; expansions can be accompanied by poor lending and unsustainable trade
imbalances, as happened in the second half of 1995 and in 1996, whereas high real interest rates,
as during 1997-1999, can damage the payment capacity of banks and enterprises, unleashing
mounting pressure for forgiveness.
                                                                                                                                                                           
whereas in other countries it was very low: Slovenia, 213; Poland, 820; Hungary, 241; Bulgaria, 291.
    
57E. Borensztein, A. Berg, R. Sahay, and J. Zettelmeyer emphasize the role of structural reforms in explaining
the speed of economic recovery in various transition countries (“The Evolution of Output in Transition
Economies: Explaining the Differences.”  Paper prepared for The Fifth Nobel Symposium in Economics.
Stockholm, 10-12 September, 1999). But one could claim that the quality of institutions (ability to undertake
structural reforms) is rooted in the history of partial reforms, in initial conditions.
    
58M. Bruno.  “Stabilization and Reform in Eastern Europe:  A Preliminary Evaluation.”  IMF Staff Papers.
Vol. 39, No. 4 (1992) pp. 753.
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Unless authorities can create and maintain a momentum of policy steadiness, the feeling
of overall uncertainty and volatility is unlikely to be mitigated. Although stop and go measures
can hardly be avoided under the circumstances, large policy fluctuations are detrimental to the
economy; they entail large income transfers among economic sectors and groups of populations,
and unnerve expectations instead of stabilizing them. Think only about the dynamic of inflation
in recent years: from about 200 percent and 295 percent in 1992 and 1993 respectively, to cca.
62 percent in 1994, 28 percent in 1995, 57 percent in 1996,59 151 percent in 1997, and 40.6
percent in 1998. This dynamic was accompanied by dramatic shifts in interest rates – from
highly negative during 1990-1993 to highly positive levels in 1994 and in subsequent years.
If the level of positive real interest rates continues to be quite high, in the absence of
substantial restructuring and of the reduction of the fuzziness of the environment, this will be
detrimental to long-term investments and would skew the composition of foreign capital inflows
in favor of portfolio capital. It would also damage the longer-term prospects for banks, since
high spreads do not help their clients and intensify adverse selection.
Without deep restructuring, high real interest rates will maintain intense strain in the
system and make it prone to instability.  In this context, the situation of potentially viable
enterprises that are burdened with heavy debts should be considered more creatively.  It should
be kept in mind that many companies are heavily in debt because they were under-capitalized by
design, and not by choice, as was the case of firms in South East Asia.  The fact is that tight
monetary conditions and high real interest rates can kill even potentially viable companies.  One
way of reducing this risk would be to distinguish between past and current payments.  On past
debts, the interest rate paid could be composed of two elements, the registered inflation rate and
the real interest prevailing on international markets, whereas current interest rates could apply
only to current payments.60  Something along this line could mitigate the plight of many
potentially sound companies.
Apart from the extraordinary pressure exerted by strain, the fuzziness of the environment
impacts people’s behavior and causes short-termism.  Fuzziness and uncertainty explain also
why banks have a very low propensity to provide long-term credit, a phenomenon enhanced by
low domestic savings61.
Large policy fluctuations can easily lead to a boom and bust evolution of the economy.
The economic dynamics in post-Communist Romania show the difficulty the policy-maker has
had in setting a corridor of policy steadiness, and its reactive stance most of the time.
Institutions ultimately determine economic performance. Institutions, understood as
socially accepted rules and procedures, determine the quality of economic policy and of its
choices as well. However, institutions cannot be created by “hocus pocus economics”;
particularly in the case of post-Communist economies, one can detect the tension between
constructivism and organicism in fostering institutional change.
                                                       
    
59Inflation rates are recorded at the end of the year.
    
60See D. Daianu, “What to do about high real interest rates?”  Ziarul Financiar (1999).   There should be a
page number, and volume and number of the journal. Martin Feldstein has proposed something similar for Asian
companies hurt by the high real interest rates resulting from austerity measures in “All is not lost for the won,”
Wall Street Journal, June 4, 1998.  There should be a page number for this article.
    
61Aggregate savings (national gross saving) was 8 percent of GDP in Romania, in 1998. This number marked
a sharp decline from 15 percent in 1997 and cca. 19 percent in 1996. This evolution can be linked with the
decline of the GDP.
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Romania’s experience shows that natura non facit saltus,-- that making institutions
function properly takes time, and that there is a grip of structure, as the product of history, that is
hard to loosen.  It would be naive to assume that the institutions of the post-Communist
economies can quickly and easily perform according to the various role models in the West; they
need time to develop in order to perform effectively.  Realism is needed not only in designing
policies, but also in making balanced judgments as to “what constitutes good performance” and
“what is to be done next.”
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Appendix 1
Strain  in a transforming economy. A formal analysis
In a transforming economy, the origin of strain can be traced to two main sources: the
fragility of institutions in the making, and the magnitude of the required reallocation of resources
(Daianu, 1994, 1997). In what follows, the focus is put on the second factor – namely,  the
ability of the system to react rapidly, via resource reallocation, to the new set of market-clearing
prices.
The magnitude of the required resource reallocation can be illustrated by the ratio:
  (2) J
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where (p*) and (q*) refer to equilibrium values, whereas (p) and (q) correspond to the
current (distorted) resource allocation. J can be viewed as a measure of aggregate disequilibrium
in the system, as against the vector of equilibrium prices and quantities.
The size of the above ratio measures the strain within the system and reflects the
magnitude of aggregate disequilibrium. It can be assumed that the possible level of
unemployment is related to the degree of strain in the system: the higher the strain (resource
misallocation), the higher the unemployment that would be brought about by the required
resource reallocation – when job creation is not intense. This is a major reason  behind the
temptation to tolerate high inflation rates as a way to diffuse the tension within a system. Strain
can be mitigated by: inter-enterprise arrears, monopoly pricing, explicit and implicit subsidies,
spill-over effects, the elimination of negative value-added activities, learning, and last, but not
least, the efficiency reserves of producers.  The more numerous are those who would lose their
jobs because of the needed resource reallocation, the more intense the opposition against
restructuring.
Another way of portraying strain is to focus on the scope of the required process of
overall income readjustment, which should fit the new market-clearing prices. The modified
form of J’ that builds on wages is:
  (2) J'
n w w
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where n denotes labor in sector (i), and wi*  and wi  refer to equilibrium and actual wage,
respectively, for the sector (i). Σni =N, where N refers to all labor resources. For the inefficient,
subsidized (explicitly, or implicitly) sectors, actual wage exceeds the marginal productivity of
labor: wi > dqi /dni . The higher is J', i.e., the higher is strain, the more fierce would be the
distribution struggle. The difference between equilibrium and actual wages reflects the resource
transfer subsidies practiced by the system; the higher this difference, the stronger the forces that
oppose change.
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In an OECD study,62 the level of strain in labor market adjustment is compared with
other countries (see Table 4). The equilibrium level was defined, in a somewhat arbitrary way,
as the structure of relative wages, on the price side, and employment, on the quantity side, in the
U.K. for the year 1994 (latest data available). Another benchmark country could be used; the
essential results do not change dramatically if, for example, France is chosen instead of the U.K.
The results suggest four main points:
i) As expected, the distance between the U.K. and the transition countries,
in particular Romania, is much higher than the distance vis-à-vis a country like France. It
is important to confirm this basic and intuitive result before pursuing further the
interpretation of the indicator.
ii) The level of strain in Romania is much higher for the employment
structure than for relative wages. Somewhat surprisingly, Romania had by 1995 a much
closer relative wage structure to the UK than other countries in transition.
iii) However, the overall required adjustment (combining the price and
quantity sides) is the highest in Romania.
iv) Finally, without the agricultural sector, the structure of the Romanian
economy would appear much closer to the other countries in transition.
This indicator confirms some of the features of the Romanian economy. Notably, the
legacy of the previous economic structure appears to be particularly heavy in Romania, at least
when compared with other transition countries in central and Eastern Europe. This may explain
why there has been so much resistance to structural change.  It may also explain why inflation
and inter-enterprise arrears have become a way of diffusing the pressure in the system when, for
political reasons, unemployment was not allowed to exceed a certain upper limit, and when non-
inflationary means for financing the budget were hardly available.
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“Romania:  Macroeconomic stabilization and restructuring, social policy.”  OECD Economic Surveys.
Paris (1998), pp.169-172
Table 4 Levels of Strain in Labor Market Adjustment
Romania Hungary Poland Czech Rep. Slovakia Slovenia Fran
c
UK
1990 1995 1992 1995 1992 1995 1991 1995 1991 1995 1993 1995 1992 1994
Relative wages (average monthly earnings = 100)
Agriculture and forestry 104.
2
81.6 68.9 76.8 82.3 90.6 97.2 84.2 99.7 81.7 105.
3
95.5 72.5 77.9
Industry 98.6 107.
6
99.0 104.
0
98.7 108.
9
104.
5
99.2 101.
4
104.
3
84.9 85.0 111.
1
116.
5
Constructions 110.
9
106.
4
90.2 84.4 106.
1
92.5 106.
2
108.
0
102.
4
104.
8
83.0 82.5 98.6 109.
2
Trade, hotel and restaurant 86.1 78.2 97.0 90.0 90.3 88.9 85.8 88.2 89.3 94.0 102.
2
99.8 90.9 69.9
Transport, communications 108.
5
121.
0
105.
8
106.
5
102.
1
101.
2
102.
1
100.
7
102.
1
108.
4
115.
0
110.
9
105.
4
144.
6
Financial banking and insurance, real
estate and other services
109.
3
126.
8
144.
7
137.
4
147.
7
137.
3
99.9 130.
7
103.
9
131.
4
143.
8
124.
6
128.
0
136.
8
Education, health and social
assistance
96.5 85.3 93.5 86.5 86.9 81.7 93.2 91.2 97.6 87.2 111.
8
109.
6
75.8 53.0
Public adm. And defense, other 88.9 88.6 118. 111. 115. 108. 88.5 103. 103. 102. 127. 132. 91.0 93.6
Index of “strain” on prices 23.0 9.8 24.1 19.7 18.3 17.0 21.1 19.1 23.8 17.2 33.9 33.1 11.7
       (excluding  agriculture) 21.2 12.9 26.0 21.3 22.9 18.1 21.2 20.0 24.0 18.6 34.5 34.8 12.0
Employment shares (%)
Agriculture and forestry 29.0 34.4 11.4 8.1 25.5 22.6 12.1 6.6 15.8 9.2 10.7 10.4 5.2 2.0
Industry 36.9 28.6 30.2 27.1 25.2 25.9 41.0 33.2 35.9 30.3 38.7 38.0 20.6 20.2
Constructions 6.5 5.0 5.4 6.0 6.6 6.1 5.7 9.2 8.2 8.6 5.4 5.1 7.2 6.4
Trade, hotel and restaurant 6.87 10.4 14.8 15.9 10.7 13.6 7.8 15.7 8.1 13.1 14.6 15.4 17.4 20.8
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Transport, communications2 7.0 5.9 8.6 8.8 5.5 5.8 9.0 7.7 5.5 7.8 6.5 5.9 5.8 5.8
Financial banking and insurance,
Real estate and other services
3.9 4.2 5.2 5.9 1.3 2.0 5.4 6.7 5.4 5.8 4.6 6.1 10.8 12.5
Education, health and social
assistance
6.7 8.1 13.6 15.6 13.1 13.3 13.8 12.1 16.5 14.5 10.2 11.4 6.9 14.5
Public adm. And defense, other
branches
3.1 3.4 10.6 12.5 12.1 10.7 5.1 8.8 4.6 10.7 9.2 7.6 26.2 17.9
Index of “strain” on quantities 91.4 76.6 47.6 37.2 60.4 56.7 68.1 47.1 68.7 45.9 62.2 56.7 13.8
           (excluding agriculture) 76.4 57.5 41.5 33.7 46.0 42.4 63.1 44.4 63.4 43.2 52.9 48.3 21.8
Indicator of total “strain” 94.2 77.2 53.3 42.1 63.1 59.2 71.3 50.8 72.6 49.0 70.9 65.6 18.1
    (excluding agriculture) 79.3 59.0 49.0 39.9 51.4 46.1 66.6 48.7 67.8 47.0 63.2 59.5 24.9
  Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Romania, Paris, 1998, pp.171
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Appendix 2
A Symptom of Systemic Strain: Inter-Enterprise Arrears
Inter-enterprise arrears reflect strain in a post-command economy. As temporary quasi-
inside money, inter-enterprise arrears endogenize the money supply growth in a perverse way,
and emasculate monetary policy to a significant extent. Concerning inter-enterprise arrears in
post-command economies, there are other explanations to highlight:  the fuzzy state of property
rights (Khan and Clifton, 1993), the primitive state of the financial system (Ickes and
Rytermann, 1992), the real credit squeeze (Calvo and Coricelli there should be a year of
publication included), the lack of policy credibility (Rostowski, 1994), disorganization (Marin
and Schitzer, 1999). In what follows, a very simple model will be used in order to underline
strain in explaining inter-enterprise arrears.
Let us suppose that the output of an agent is an increasing function of market discipline
visualized as a public good, or as a positive externality – as a means for easing the efficient
allocation of resources. Market discipline emerges as a public good and as a positive externality
because of collective (generalized) good behavior. The state does not supply it, though it can
influence its production by the enforcement of bankruptcy procedures and the provision of other
institutional means. Nonetheless, the state policy of enforcement becomes irrelevant when
collective good behavior is impossible for various reasons, and, as is our contention, because of
strain in the main.
Were market disciplines perfect and resource reallocation fast enough, inter-enterprise
arrears would not exist; any inefficiency would be promptly penalized. Should inter-enterprise
arrears arise, however, they would harm creditors – a fact which would be reflected by their
output. Taking immediate resource allocation as a working hypothesis,  it can be assumed that
the production of agent (i) is:
qi = q + c · g for the agents who do not cause arrears
   = q for the agents who cause arrears
Another assumption is that the level of financial discipline (g) – seen as a positive
externality – is determined by nt, where (t) indicates whether agents pay their debts, and (n)
refers to those who do not cause arrears. A final assumption is that c<1<N, where N>1/c.
Multiple equilibrium situations can be imagined depending on agents’ behavior and the
existence of financial discipline as a public good. If agents pay their debts in due time, their
incomes show up as q+c g-t, whereas if they produce arrears, their earnings appear as simply (q).
The decision for an enterprise is to cause arrears if c·g = c·nt<t or, n<1/c, i.e., when the number
of those who pay in due time is low. A conclusion would follow: when policy credibility is low,
and when financial discipline is widely disregarded, agents are tempted to produce arrears.
Instead, if n=N, agent N is stimulated to pay debts, since n=N>1/c, as our assumption says.
It would seem that everything boils down to policy credibility, to the functioning of
market discipline. However, a critical question arises. What is going to happen, and what can be
done if the number of those who do not pay is high and, what is even more important, non-
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payment is the result of the lack of capacity to pay. This means that non-payment is not an
opportunistic response to the existing circumstances concerning financial discipline, or the low
policy credibility. Consequently, whichever is the determination of decision-makers to pursue a
policy course, the sheer number of those who cannot pay makes n<1/c – and thus, the vicious
circle of arrears comes into being.
Moreover, the working hypothesis should be made more realistic by assuming that
resource reallocation is slow. In this case, a complete exit of the inefficient, but still positive,
value-added enterprises would mean that output is substantially less than if arrears emerge in the
system. Consequently, the short-run production function of an agent could be redefined as:
qi  = q + c·g no arrears and immediate resource reallocation
     = q arrears and no, or very slow reallocation of resources
= q - k no arrears and no, or very slow reallocation of
resources – the case of an efficient agent
     = 0 no arrears (full exit) and no resource reallocation - the case of an
                                          inefficient agent
where k indicates the fall of output when there is full exit. It is clear that, under the
circumstances, the second situation, that includes arrears, appears as a preferred solution for the
short term. It should be stressed that the choice of agents is influenced – in most cases – by their
wage fund-centered goal function.
Therefore, when resource reallocation is very slow and when the number of those who
cannot pay because of the lack of capacity to pay is high, policy credibility cannot be the main
factor behind the growth of arrears.  The main factor is represented by the large number of
enterprises that, at the new equilibrium prices, would have to get out of the economic circuit.
Since such a huge exit is impossible, inter-enterprise arrears emerge as a symptom of strain in
the system and as a way to diffuse strain.
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Appendix 3
From Supply-Constraints to Tax-Evasion
Figure 1:     Over-regulation (taxation) and the distribution of activities between the official and the
underground sector
It can be submitted that, the more regulated (and taxed) an economy is, the more induced
agents are to operate in the underground sector. It can be also admitted that there exists an
optimal structure and level of regulation of the economy which maximizes societal welfare;
clearly, the optimal structure and level of regulation depend on social norms, values and
principles which validate what people at large appreciate as being positive and, particularly,
negative externalities.
Figure 1 tries to illustrate this optimality by dividing the economy into two sectors: the
official and unofficial sectors, which both consume factors of production (labor and capital).
Point A, which signals the optimal composition of the economy, is tangent to the highest welfare
curve, W. Both over-regulation and under-regulation lead to inferior compositions of the
economy in terms of societal welfare. Thus, over-regulation means an expansion of the
underground economy against the background of reduced overall efficiency; in Figure 1 the
effect of over-regulation is indicated by the lower welfare curve, W1, which goes through point
B. Likewise, an under-regulated system (as in the case of environmental protection) entails an
‘official’ expansion of socially pernicious activities, which also reduces societal welfare; point C
indicates this lower welfare level, W2. The shape of the combination curve indicates that both
hyper-regulation, as in a command system, and the lack of regulation, where there are  no rules,
can lead to an implosion of the economy.
When regulations. or taxes, rise – when the cost line of regulations moves from I to I1 —
there is a shift of the price line in favor of the unofficial sector in the sense of stimulating its
expansion.  This happens because the goods produced in the official sector become more
expensive. Another effect is an increase of the nominal prices of the goods and services in the
underground economy, although they become relatively cheaper, which can be only partially
cost line of regulation
W2
W1
W
A
C
B
I
I1
UE 
(underground 
economy)
(official economy)K, L OE
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mitigated by its expansion.  This expansion puts downward pressure on prices in the unofficial
economy.
